Amcu Recognition Agreement

“National laws or regulations may subject the extension of a collective agreement to the following conditions: (a) that the collective agreement already covers a certain number of employers and workers concerned, which is, according to the competent authority, sufficiently representative.” [40] It follows that the agreement was effectively extended to AMCU members in the five AMCU mines. The question now is whether the legal provision that allowed it to withstand constitutional control. (g) do not discriminate against the provisions of the collective agreement against third parties.” [17] The House recognizes that Section 23 (1) (d) limits the right to strike. The Minister disputes this, but argues that the restriction, if it does, is justified. NUM argues that Section 23 (1) (d) does not limit the right to strike at all, at least in the immediate future. And any indirect restriction is reasonable and defensible. The AMCU says that the restriction cannot be justified by Article 36 of the Constitution. [21] The House, the Minister and the NUM say it is possible. The other parties to the disputed agreement did not participate in the proceedings and respected the result. (e) the collective agreement provides that an independent body hears the appeal against the appeal as soon as possible and no later than 30 days after the complaint is filed, and that it will rule on the appeal- 23.

All living allowances will be increased by R50.00 per month and the minimum will be R2000.00 (two thousand rand) per month effective October 1, 2013. Subsequently, not all allowances will be increased, but will remain the same for the duration of this agreement. [80] All of this clearly indicates a power that is more than private. It`s public. The conclusion of a collective agreement that triggers an extension authorized by law under section 23 (1)d) is, in effect and, for the most part, an exercise of the public authority delegated by the law. This is not the same as the statutory power of the wills to the deceased. 14. In this agreement, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention: [16] Paragraph 32, paragraph 5, authorizes the Minister to extend an agreement even if the employers` and trade union parties that are part of the bargaining council do not have a sectoral majority, provided they are “sufficiently representative” in the scope of the bargaining council.

[7] The House is a registered employer organization and acts as a representative of its members` collective agreements. Collective bargaining, at least with regard to wages and other material conditions of employment, is conducted on a centralized basis within a non-legal bargaining forum. Since 2001, the collective agreements thus concluded have been applied by members of the House, in a partisan manner, to workers who are not members of the party`s unions, as well as to non-union members. Zondo JP has adopted several provisions of the LRA in forums that illustrate the legislative policy that decides. [40] Two of the most intrusive are enough. It is the majority vote that underlies the statutes that underlie both the agency operating agreements (deductions of the union majority fees of all employees, members and non-members) and the store contracts concluded (the collective agreement may require all employees to be members of the majority union). [42] This does not mean that these provisions are invulnerable to constitutional attacks. They only need to emphasize that they focus on the classification of the status as a whole. [87] But there is no need to answer that question now. The facts and the abitrating of the arguments of the parties before us do not require speculative search of cases of irrational in-practice (unlike the face). Suffice it to say that parties renewing agreements within the meaning of Section 23, paragraph 1, point (d), are not allowed to exercise the power conferred on the statute in an irrational manner.